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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines how female representation in local elected (mayor and legislature) and administrative 
(mid-level manager) positions influences municipal financial decision making in 764 Japanese city-level 
governments. Findings show that female representation in local councils is positively correlated with risk-
averse behavior in financial decisions, as female representation on the legislature is negatively associated 
with issuing municipal bonds as well as with local investment in public corporations. Female representa-
tion in executive (mayor and vice-mayor) and mid-level administrative managerial positions has no appar-
ent effects on local financial decisions. This study tests existing explanations of relationships between 
female managerial representation and fiscal behavior in an Asian developed setting characterized by con-
siderable underrepresentation of women in politics. 
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Introduction 
Closing the gender gap in political representation is a priority in many countries and for the international 
community, as exemplified in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals(United Nations n.d.). 
One potential barrier to achieving this goal is a lack of understanding regarding the effects of female rep-
resentation. Large volumes of studies have examined gender differences in preferences, attitudes, and 
behaviors, and the impacts of such differences on employee behaviors and organizational outcomes. 
However, the intersection of gender representation and public financial decisions is not well understood. 
This study examines one particularly understudied aspect of this intersection: gender and risk taking be-
havior in public finance. Existing studies of economics and business management suggest that women’s 
preferences and attitudes toward risk differ from those of men. On average, women are less willing to take 
financial risks (Bernasek and Shwiff 2001, Charness and Gneezy 2012, Croson and Gneezy 2009, 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). Therefore, such gender differences in risk attitudes may or may not affect 
overall firm performance (Huang and Kisgen 2013, Atkinson, Baird, and Frye 2003, Berger, Kick, and 
Schaeck 2014, Bellucci, Borisov, and Zazzaro 2010, Palvia, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa 2015, Pletzer et al. 
2015). Few studies have examined how this gender difference plays out with respect to risk-taking behav-
ior in local public finance, a research gap we aim to address. 
 
In private financial economics, existing scholarship has examined how gender affects both firm perfor-
mance and financial decision-making (Berger, Kick, and Schaeck 2014, Charness and Gneezy 2012, 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, Post and Byron 2015, Schubert et al. 1999). In contrast to this substantial 
body of research, in the public sector, the gender-financial decision making connection has been largely 
understudied. Examining the gender effects on public finance is important from the perspective of repre-
sentative bureaucracy (Meier and Nigro 1976, Meier and Melton 2014). The theory of representative bu-
reaucracy suggests that women’s life experiences and preferences differ in many ways from those of men, 
leading to differences in administrative decision making. For example, female legislators can produce poli-
cy outcomes that fit more closely with the interests and preferences of female citizens (Dolan 2000). Addi-
tionally, existing studies on representative bureaucracy report gender-based differences in employee behav-
iors and attitudes, and the impacts of gender on organizational outcomes (D’Agostino 2015, Esteve et 
al. 2012, Grissom, Nicholson-Crotty, and Keiser 2012, Meier and Nicholson‐Crotty 2006, Meier and 
Funk 2016, Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014, Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Li 2016, Saidel and Loscocco 
2005). Likewise, political scientists have reported that female representation in legislatures affects service 
provision, as well as content and approval of legislation, committee assignments, levels of corruption, and 
political trust and participation (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001, Michelle Heath, Schwindt‐Bayer, and 
Taylor‐Robinson 2005, Lawless 2004, Wängnerud 2009).  
 
  
Most of these published studies on women’s political representation focus on the national level; very few 
address gender representation at the municipal/local level (Pini and McDonald 2011). This omission con-
trasts with the increasing participation of women in local politics. Although female presence at the local 
level is far from achieving gender parity, worldwide there has been a considerable increase in female repre-
sentation in both local elected and appointed posts. This local momentum may reflect a perception that 
participation in local politics is more attainable for women. Despite this trend, limited attention has been 
devoted to identifying women’s impact in local governance.  
 
To address this research gap, this study assesses the link between gender representation and risk-
taking/aversion in local public finance. Specifically, this study explores the role of female representation in 
municipal financial decision-making. Our first goal is to test how local female representation in elected 
(mayor, vice-mayor, and legislature) and administrative (middle-level manager) positions influences finan-
cial decision-making, in terms of issuing municipal bonds, investment in public corporations, and budget 
allocations to reserve funds. Our second goal is to test whether the political ideology and expertise of fe-
male representatives in administrative and legislative positions affect municipal financial decisions, as poli-
ticians’ ideology may also affect their preferences in financial decision making (Petry 1982). Studies report 
evidence for the “ideology thesis,” which suggests that conservatives prefer low spending, low taxes, and 
less debt both at the national and state level (Alt and Lowry 1994, Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999). Fur-
thermore, the experience (i.e. expertise) of female legislators also is expected to influence their preferences 
in financial decisions.  
 
We test our propositions using a data set of 764 Japanese cities during a six-year period (2007-2012). After 
controlling for potential confounding factors, findings show that female representation in local councils 
and conservative ideology of local councils are positively correlated with risk-averse behavior in financial 
decision making. Specifically, female representation in city councils is negatively associated with issuing 
municipal bonds, as well as with local investment in public corporations. In addition, local council ideolo-
gy is negatively correlated with the issuing of municipal bonds and budget allocation to reserve funds. 
However, female representation in executive (mayor and vice-mayor) and mid-level managerial positions 
does not appear to affect local financial decisions. The expertise of female councilors also does not appear 
to influence municipal financial decision-making.  
 
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this study adds to the understanding of the 
impacts of gender representation on local public finance. The idea of gender-based differences in risk-
taking behavior has been well established in the economics and finance literature. Although there are sev-
eral studies that examine the impacts of gender composition in managerial positions on firm performance, 
there is limited scholarship about how gender representation in local public office affects municipal finan-
cial behavior. Our study therefore tests if the gender-financial decision making relationship observed in 
private organizations holds in the context of public organizations. Second, while considerable research has 
  
examined the role of female legislators at the national and state level, little is known about their influence 
in local legislatures. Our study focuses on the city level, and examines gender effects on fiscal decision-
making in municipalities. Third, by testing our propositions in a Confucian male-dominant society (Fair-
bank, Reischauer, and Craig 1973) with relatively low levels of female representation both in politics and 
society compared to other advanced democracies (Ogai 2001, Eto 2010, Bochel and Bochel 2005, Bochel 
et al. 2003, World Economic Forum n.d., UNDP 2016), this study assesses whether female representation 
in such a male dominant context is associated with changes in financial decision making.i Our findings 
show that even in a context of male-dominant institutions, the presence of female city councilors does 
influence municipal financial performance.   
This paper is organized into five sections. The first section introduces the concepts of gender representa-
tion and attributes of female representatives, provides the rationale for testing these factors, and derives 
the testable hypotheses. The second section provides background information on Japanese municipalities 
and their experience with gender representation in local governments. The third section describes the 
research design and variable operationalization, followed by a fourth section containing results and analy-
sis. The fifth section presents conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
 
The Impact of Gender Representation on Policy Outcomes 
Existing scholarship has examined whether the degree of gender representation affects organizational 
outcomes both in private and public organizations. Scholars of business management and financial eco-
nomics investigate how gender representation in managerial positions impacts firm performance, such as 
accounting returns and market performance (Post and Byron 2015). Previous studies have examined how 
gender affects policy priorities (Holman 2014, Park 2014, Ferreira and Gyourko 2014, Svaleryd 2009, 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Clots-Figueras 2011, Funk and Gathmann 2006, Smith 2014, Bratton and 
Ray 2002), budget size and balance (Krogstrup and Wälti 2011, Ferreira and Gyourko 2014, Jochimsen 
and Thomasius 2014, Funk and Gathmann 2006), socioeconomic outcomes (Ferreira and Gyourko 2014, 
Clots-Figuerasa 2012), and further female representation (Meier and Funk 2016).  
The principle underlying these studies is that women have different perspectives and preferences from 
men. Therefore, involving women in government, especially in influential positions, brings a new set of 
concerns in decision-making and consequently affects policy outcomes (Bratton and Ray 2002). Empirical 
evidence supports this notion. For instance, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) report that elected female 
leaders across 265 Indian villages tend to invest more in the provision of services that are closely associat-
ed with women’s interests and concerns. Likewise, Smith (2014) documents that U.S. municipalities with 
empowered female leaders are likely to have more women-friendly policies.ii 
 
Other studies suggest that the effects of female politicians on policy outcomes are contingent on other 
factors. For example, in her study of U.S. municipalities, Holman (2014) suggests that even at the munici-
pal level, and despite limited fiscal autonomy, the presence of a female mayor increases social welfare 
spending. Holman also finds that the presence of female councilors alone does not change spending on 
  
social welfare programs when the city’s mayor is not female. Only when the mayor gender is female, the 
percent of female councilors significantly increase welfare spending. Clots-Figuerasa (2012) also reports 
empirical evidence for a contingent effect, as she finds that an increase in female representatives enhances 
an individual’s probability of attaining primary education in urban areas, but not in rural areas. The effect 
of women on policy outcomes also seems to be contingent on the type of policy area. For instance, invest-
ing the link between female mayor and municipal government size, spending allocation patterns, employ-
ment, and crime rates in U.S. cities, Ferreira and Gyourko (2014) find that the gender of the mayor is un-
related to these outcomes. This variation of findings across policy areas can be explained on the ground 
that “women hold different attitudes and priorities than do men” (Bratton and Ray 2002, 429). Moreover, 
the variation of findings calls for further tests on the role of female representation in understudied local 
issues such as financial decisions.  
 
Gender differences and financial decision-making 
Although previous studies have examined relationships between gender representation and policy out-
comes, scarce research has explored the gender representation-public finance connection. In the private 
sector, literature on gender and financial behavior has reported a strong link between gender and individu-
al preference and behavior regarding financial decision-making (Barber and Odean 2001, Bernasek and 
Shwiff 2001, Charness and Gneezy 2012, Croson and Gneezy 2009, Eckel and Grossman 2002, 2008, 
Filippin and Crosetto 2016, Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998, Schubert et al. 1999). Specifically, these stud-
ies find that women, when compared with men, exhibit more risk aversion in financial decision-making. 
For instance, using U.S. survey data, Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that single women report more 
risk-averse behavior in terms of household holdings of risky assets than do single men. Likewise, Eckel 
and Grossman (2002) find in their experimental study that women are four times more likely to take the 
risk-free gamble option than men. Similarly, Charness and Gneezy (2012) reassess data from 15 experi-
mental studies concerning gender and financial risk-taking behavior and find a strong connection between 
gender and risk-taking preferences. Their results suggest that women tend to make smaller investments in 
risky financial assets than men.   
 
Another line of studies examines how gender representation in managerial positions affects corporate 
performance (Chen, Crossland, and Huang 2014, Dezsö and Ross 2012, Harris 2014, Palvia, Vähämaa, 
and Vähämaa 2015, Post and Byron 2015, Pletzer et al. 2015). The notion is that top managers’ traits and 
preferences affect corporate financial policies (Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013). These studies have pro-
duced mixed results. For instance, a meta-analysis of 140 existing studies by Post and Byron (2015) reports 
only a small correlation between gender diversity on firm boards and their financial performance. By using 
a panel data of commercial banks in the U.S., Palvia, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa (2015) report that, after 
controlling for other factors, banks with female CEOs are more financially conservative and tend to have 
higher levels of equity capital, suggesting that female CEOs exhibit risk-averse behavior. However, based 
on their meta-analysis of 20 studies on female representation and firm performance, Pletzer et al. (2015) 
  
conclude that financial performance of firms is not significantly related to female representation on corpo-
rate boards.  
 
Do gender fiscal differences found in the private sector apply to public organizations? Surprisingly, limited 
attention has been paid to the impact of gender on risk-taking behavior in public finances. Some of the 
few exceptions examine the role of gender in government spending at the macro level. For example, 
Krogstrup and Wälti (2011) and Funk and Gathmann (2006) explore how the granting of female voting 
rights affects government deficits. These studies find that the enfranchisement of women is related to 
lower levels of budget deficits (Krogstrup and Wälti 2011) and lower spending levels (Funk and Gath-
mann 2006).  
 
Results of studies of representative bureaucracies suggest that gender representation affects organizational 
outcomes such as promotion of coproduction (Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Li 2016), social justice 
(D’Agostino 2015), and law enforcement (Meier and Nicholson‐Crotty 2006). Studies of female repre-
sentation in legislatures also show a positive influence of female elected officials on women-friendly policy 
outputs (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Clots-Figuerasa 2012, Park 2014, Smith 2014, Svaleryd 2009). 
Another line of scholarship suggests that women legislators tend to initiate proposals on social, family, and 
feminist issues, while male representatives place emphasis on economic and business issues (Saint-German 
1989, Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013). These results have led us to propose that female representa-
tion at the local level, both in appointed and elected posts, is associated with risk-averse behavior in finan-
cial decision making. Therefore, following previous studies on gender impacts on finance, we generate the 
following two hypotheses:  
 
H1a: Female representation in local legislatures is negatively correlated with risk- taking behavior in fiscal decision-making. 
 
H1b: Female representation in local public managerial positions (executive and administrative) is negatively correlated with 
risk-taking behavior in fiscal decision-making. 
 
Public manager positions (H1b) here refer to mayor, vice-mayor, and mid-level manager positions. 
 
Ideology of Legislators 
Legislators’ ideology also may affect their preferences and behavior.iii The “government ideology thesis” 
suggests that parties are not only vote seekers but also policy seekers (Petry 1982). While conservatives 
prefer low spending, low taxes, and less debt, liberals prefer higher spending, higher taxes, and are more 
likely to acquire debt (Alt and Lowry 1994, Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999). Studies report evidence for 
the ideology thesis both at the national and state level. A study by Erikson and his colleagues (1989) found 
that both public opinion and Democratic Party control explain most state policies. Likewise, Alt and Low-
  
ry (1994) demonstrated that party affiliation influences state spending in the United States, and Kontopou-
los and Perotti (1999) provide cross-national evidence for the liberal and conservative policy preferences. 
Therefore, if ideology matters, we should see its effect in local public finances. That is, conservative legis-
lators are expected to be more risk-averse in investing and issuing municipal bonds. Consequently, 
 
H2a: Conservative representation in local legislatures is negatively correlated with risk-taking behavior in fiscal decision-
making. 
 
We should also expect a multiplicative risk-aversion effect in financial decision-making in conservative 
legislatures with greater female representation. Therefore,   
 
H2b: The greater the number of conservative legislators and the greater the number of female legislators, the greater the risk-
averse behavior in fiscal decision-making.  
 
Expertise of Female Legislators 
The expertise level of female legislators should also matter for fiscal decision-making. According to Erics-
son, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer (1993), expertise refers to the “domain-specific skills and knowledge that 
are important to attainment of expert performance” (365), and “is acquired slowly over a very long time as 
a result of practice” (366). That is, with extensive practice, an individual can become very adept at a par-
ticular task or job, whether technical, non-technical, or both, because “[e]xperts are faster and more accu-
rate… and their memory for representative stimuli from their domain is vastly superior to that of lesser 
experts, especially for briefly presented stimuli” (Ericsson et al. 1993, 365). Experience on a particular task 
leads chief executives to accumulate (1) wisdom, (2) in-depth knowledge, (3) the ability to respond to situ-
ations, and (4) group experience, which together constitute expertise (Avellaneda 2016, see also Littlepage, 
Robison, and Reddington (1997).   
 
Empirical evidence has shown that experts’ superior performance is acquired through long experience, 
and that the effect of practice on performance is large (Ericsson et al. 1993: 365–368, see also Glaser, Chi, 
and Farr (1988). A recent study of U.S. legislation in Congress over a 30-year period by Volden and his 
colleagues (2013) “reveals that most (but not all) of the classically considered women’s issues are indeed 
raised at an enhanced rate by congresswomen,” yet these proposals have been less successful than those of 
male legislators. One reason for this lack of success may be female legislators’ short duration of experi-
ence, i.e. lack of expertise. This possibility leads us to suggest that at the local level, female legislators with 
more experience in the city council should be more familiar and comfortable with fiscal decision making. 
While female politicians have been historically less inclined to address business and economics matters 
(Saint-Germain 1989), a longer duration of experience in local legislatures may lead them to be more likely 
to become risk takers in public finances. Politicians with more experience are expected to learn from past 
decisions, which in turn allows them to have better judgement in taking more risks Therefore,  
  
 
H3: Expertise of female legislators is positively correlated with risk-taking behavior in fiscal decision-making. 
 
Case Selection: Japanese Local Governments 
The setting for this study is Japanese local governments. Japan is a suitable case for the following reasons. 
First, as Japanese local governments face the highest debt-to-GDP ratio (226%) among Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries (OECD 2015), they experience continued central 
government pressures to improve local public finance. Most of local overspending derives from rapid 
population aging and inadequate revenue collection due to both prolonged economic stagnation and 
population declines. Therefore, local financial decisions are primary concerns for local governments.  
 
Second, Japan exhibits lower levels of female political representation than most other developed and de-
veloping countries (Bochel and Bochel 2005, Eto 2010, Khatwani , Mikanagi 2001). Although there has 
been a considerable increase in the number of women in politics in recent years, Japan offers an excellent 
setting to test the impact of limited descriptive representation of women in local government. In addition, 
Japan still lags behind other advanced countries regarding gender equality in general. For instance, Japan 
ranks very low among developed nations in indicators such as maternal employment rates, gender gap in 
full-time earnings, and ratio of women in managerial positions. Japan’s gender gap is large and persistent 
(Estévez-Abe 2013). Therefore, male-dominant culture and norm are prevalent in Japan, which potentially 
shapes gendered behavior of managers in the public sphere. This study examines how gender representa-
tion affects policy outcomes within a context of such male-dominant gendered institutions.  
 
Third, Japanese local governments have consistent administrative structures regardless of their geographic 
location and municipal size, allowing us to control for institutional factors. Furthermore, Japanese regions 
are less diverse with respect to culture, ethnicity, and economy than many other developed countries.iv 
Such homogeneity helps us to control for other factors that may potentially influence our dependent vari-
ables. Finally, few studies focus on local Japanese governments, despite Japan’s status as an advanced 
democratic country. Consequently, this study also contributes to the recent increased interest in contextual 
factors in public management and performance in a cross-national setting (Meier, Rutherford, and 
Avellaneda 2017, O’Toole and Meier 2014) by investigating one of the understudied context in public 
management, Japanese local government.  
 
Japan’s 1947 Constitution stipulates a unitary system and guarantees autonomy of local governments. The 
“Local Autonomy Law” (Article 92) defines local government operations. Japan adopted a unitary political 
and administrative system with a two-tiered local government structure: prefecture as the regional gov-
ernment unit and municipality as the local government unit. Municipalities, in turn, are categorized as 
cities, towns, or villages. As of April 2014, Japan has 47 prefectures and 1,718 municipalities and, of these, 
790 are cities, 745 are towns, and 183 are villages (MIC 2014b).  
  
 
Japanese local government structure consists of the legislative branch and the executive branch. The rela-
tionship between the legislative and executive bodies found in Japanese municipalities is classified as a 
“strong-mayor” system in the United States. The chief executive holds exclusive power over all executive 
agencies (CLAIR 2013, Kawasaki 2000). Japanese local governments have adopted a presidential system, 
in which both the mayor and the local assembly members are directly elected by voters. The mayor ap-
points a vice-mayor with the consent of the local assembly. The vice-mayor supports the mayor’s initia-
tives and planning.v 
 
The mayor and the local assembly are separate and independent entities. This Japanese structure has been 
adopted uniformly across municipalities (CLAIR 2013). Mayors’ rights include enacting regulations, pre-
paring budgets, proposing bills, and appointing or dismissing staff. Local assemblies have voting rights in 
matters including budget and ordinances, and can conduct a no-confidence vote in mayors. In order to 
provide the same standard of local government services across all municipalities, the central government 
makes financial adjustments among local municipalities by distributing a certain portion of the national tax 
to local governments based on financial capabilities (CLAIR 2013). Most localities are largely dependent 
on national transfers. In 2012, transfers accounted for approximately 45 percent of the total revenues of 
all city-, town-, and village-level governments. Local tax, which is the primary local source of revenue, 
accounted for 32.7 percent of total revenue (MIC 2014a). 
 
Female representation in Japanese local government 
Despite considerable improvements in the past decade, Japanese women’s representation in politics has 
been low compared with other developed and developing countries. According to a survey conducted by 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Japan’s share of women in its lower house of parliament reached only 9.5 
percent in 2016, ranking Japan 155 out of 193 surveyed countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016).  
Female representation in local government is also low. Female mayors are very few; in 2016, there were 
only 21 female mayors in all 1,721 city, town, and village-level municipalities, meaning only 1.2 percent of 
municipalities had female mayors. In local legislatures, representation is higher but still very low: In 2016 
the average share of female local councilors in municipal assemblies is 12.6 percent. However, across mu-
nicipalities, there is considerable variation in female representation on local councils (Cabinet Office of 
Japan 2016a). Women’s representation in local administration, while also remaining low, is nevertheless 
considerably higher than female representation at the national administrative level. In 2015, the percentage 
of female local officials who held more than middle-level managerial positions was 12.6 percent across all 
city, town, and village-level municipalities, compared with 3.3 percent at the national level (Cabinet Office 
of Japan 2015a, 2015b).  
 
Previous studies offer several explanations for low female political representation in Japan. One explana-
tion points to historical factors. Among industrialized nations, Japan was a relative latecomer to universal 
  
suffrage for women. While Japanese men achieved universal suffrage for men in 1925, women’s voting 
rights and eligibility for election were not granted until the end of the Second World War in 1945 (Bochel 
et al. 2003, Bochel and Bochel 2005). Persistent male-dominated political culture might be another expla-
nation (Bochel et al. 2003, Eto 2010). Traditionally, in Japan, political parties, the general public, and 
women themselves consider Japanese politics to be men’s business (Eto 2010). Moreover, having support 
from local groups (called koenkai) played a pivotal role in candidates winning seats in the Diet’ lower house 
elections. Men, and especially male councilors, have had strong local connections with koenkais, but wom-
en tend to have less strong local networks, as married women tend to move to residential areas in which 
their husbands have connections (Bochel and Bochel 2005, Ogai 2001). In this male-dominant political 
context, cultural norms hamper closing the gender gap in political representation. 
 
Data Collection and Variable Operationalization 
In this study, the unit of analysis is the municipality-year. We target all city-level municipalities from 2007 
to 2012, covering 752 cities.vi Towns and villages were excluded due to limited data. Likewise, we focus on 
this specific time period due to data availability. To obtain data on female representation, we rely on the 
following two data sets: (1) Handbook of Data on Japanese Women in Political Life (2007 and 2011 editions) 
(Ichikawa Fusae Kinenkai 2007, 2011) and (2) the Cabinet Office’s report on gender equality (Gender 
Equality Bureau Cabinet Office 2007-2012). Mayoral political data are obtained from the List of Local Chief 
Executives (2007-2012 editions) (Chihō Jichi Sōgo ̄ Kenkyūjo 2007-2012) and Profiles of Governors and Mayors 
in Japan (2007-2012 editions) (Chihō Gyo ̄zaisei Chōsakai 2007-2012). Dependent variables and other con-
trol variables are collected from Regional Statistics (MIC 2015b) and Settlement of Municipality Finances: 2006-
2012 (MIC 2006-2012).  
 
Although our dataset covers a six-year period, most variables do not have much within-municipality varia-
tion because variables related to local councilors and mayors do not change much year to year. The term 
length of the local council and mayor is four years in Japan. In addition, there are no fixed start and end 
years for council and mayoral terms that apply to all municipalities.vii Therefore, our six-year data set co-
vers at least two local council and mayoral terms per municipality. Variables such as conservative local 
council percentage, average elected terms of local councilors, mayoral reelection, and mayor’s vote share 
do not change within each term, but they change only when a new term begins. Therefore, for most mu-
nicipalities, variables related to local councils and mayors are based on two data periods.viii  
 
Measuring Financial Decision Making  
In this study, we focus on financial decision-making in terms of risk-taking behavior in local public fi-
nance. Specifically, we operationalize financial risk-taking behavior with the following three indicators: (1) 
municipal bonds issued per year, (2) municipal investment in public corporations, and (3) municipal budg-
et deposited for reserve funds. These measurements are collected from annual reports of financial settle-
  
ments of municipalities for a six-year period (2007-2012). In Japanese local governments, only the mayor 
has the right to submit a budget plan. However, the mayor’s budget plan is considered by local councils, 
which may opt for approving, modifying, or denying the plan (Osugi 2008).  
 
We assume issuing municipal bonds exemplifies risk-taking behavior in financial decision-making. Recent 
reforms largely increased local government discretion in issuing municipal bonds. Prior to 2006, local gov-
ernments needed to obtain approval either from the governor or the central government in order to issue 
municipal bonds. However, from April 2006 to 2012, local governments were only required to consult 
with either the minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) or the prefectural 
governor before issuing bonds. A 2012 reform gave municipalities further freedom to issue bonds by re-
quiring only notification of either the minister of the MIC or the prefectural governor (MIC 2015a). As 
our data set covers the 2007-2012 period, we investigate the period in which municipalities had only to 
consult with the minister or governor before issuing bonds, but had not yet reached their current level of 
autonomy requiring only notification. Bond issuance is a continuous variable reported in Japanese yen and 
per capita.  
 
The second indicator operationalizing risk-taking behavior in financial decision-making is municipal in-
vestment in and contributions to either public enterprise, quasi-public corporations, or public corpora-
tions. In Japan, it is common to see municipal investments in and contributions to public hospitals or 
entities providing water, sewage, and transportation. In 2012, for example, 86 percent of Japan’s total mu-
nicipal investment and contribution targeted such public municipal enterprises (MIC 2014a). Since 2002, 
public enterprise businesses have been declining due to restructuring and municipal consolidation (MIC 
n.d.-a). Moreover, a 2009 law provides local governments with incentives for reducing debts and maintain-
ing more financially sound management of these enterprises. Therefore, given the decline in local public 
corporations and pressure for sound financial management, we assume that investing in and contributing 
local budgets to these entities is a risk-taking behavior. Investment in public businesses is a continuous 
variable reported in Japanese yen and per capita.  
 
The third indicator operationalizing financial decision-making relates to municipal budgets allocated to 
reserve funds in a given year. Reserve funds are established by municipalities for the purpose of long-term 
financial stability and financial planning. Reserve funds allow municipal governments to legally save money 
in order to finance specific future projects and manage unexpected future expenditures. Therefore, saving 
money in reserve funds should illustrate risk-averse behavior in public finance. Reserve fund allocation is a 
continuous variable reported in Japanese yen per capita.  
 
Independent Variables 
In this study, we examine female representation in two local branches: legislative and executive. Gender 
representation in local councils is operationalized by the percentage of female councilors (H1a). The data 
  
are obtained from the Handbook of Data on Japanese Women in Political Life (2007 and 2011 editions) (Ichika-
wa Fusae Kinenkai 2007, 2011). Female representation in administrative positions refers to the percentage 
of local female employees in managerial positionsix (H1b). Data are collected from the Cabinet Office’s 
report on gender equality (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office 2007-2012). Female mayors and vice-
mayors is a dummy variable. We assign a value of “1” to those municipalities that have either a female 
mayor or a female vice-mayor and assign “0” to those municipalities with neither a female mayor more a 
female vice mayor.  
 
Regarding local councilor ideology (H2a), we focus on conservative ideology of local legislators. In doing 
so, we calculate the percentage of councilors affiliated with the two major conservative parties (Liberal 
Democratic Party and Komei Party). To test the interactive H2b hypothesis, we created an interaction 
term multiplying the percentage of conservative legislators with the percentage of female legislators. Con-
servative ideology variable is centered to reduce multicollinearity. To test the expertise hypothesis (H3), 
for each council, we calculate the average terms of all female councilors, which serve a proxy for expertise 
of female councilors. In Japan, local councilors may be re-elected for an indefinite number of terms, and 
there is no age limit to serve as a counselor.  
 
Control Variables 
This study controls for other factors expected to influence financial decision-making. We control for polit-
ical, socio-economic, and structural/organizational factors. Among the political factors, we control for 
mayors’ political ideology, re-election periods, vote share, and councilors’ political ideology. Given that, in 
Japan, mayoral candidates typically have no party designation, mayors’ political ideology is operationalized 
with a dummy, which is labeled “1” when the elected mayor received support from any conservative party 
(Liberal Democratic Party or Komei Party) during his/her election campaign. Otherwise, it takes “0.” As 
mayors may be re-elected for an indefinite number of terms, their long-term experience in office — that 
is, expertise — should influence their financial decision-making. Therefore, we use a continuous variable 
to capture the number of times a mayor has been re-elected. Mayors’ vote share is a continuous variable, 
reported as a percentage.  
 
Demographic and socio-economic controls are (1) unemployment rate and (2) the percentage of workers 
in the agricultural, forestry, and fishing sector economy (to account for rural classification). We also con-
trol for one structural factor: whether the municipality has experienced a merger. Since 1999, most Japa-
nese local governments have experienced municipal mergers. Hence, the number of municipalities, includ-
ing city, town, and village level municipalities, declined from 3,232 in 1999 to 1,718 in 2014. Most mergers 
took place in 2004 and 2005. The main impetus for municipal mergers was to take advantage of econo-
mies of scale, as municipalities with larger populations deliver services at lower per capita or unit costs 
(Dollery, Byrnes, and Crase 2007, Fox and Gurley-Calvez 2006). Therefore, municipal consolidation is 
  
expected to reduce fixed costs and administrative duplication. If a municipality experienced a merger, we 
assign a value of “1”; otherwise “0.” 
 
Finally, we control for a municipality’s prior year’s accumulated debt (per capita) and accumulated reserve 
funds (per capita), as these factors are expected to influence future financial decisions. Finally, we also 
include a dummy variable for each year, leaving year 2007 as the excluded category. Table 1 provides the 
descriptive statistics for all the variables and Table 2 reports the panel descriptive statistics.  
 
TABLE 1, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
    
Municipal Bonds/capita 39,349.54  48,688.39  0 2,954,098  
Public Investment/capita 1,457.88  3,448.40  0 100,055  
Reserve Funds/capita 15,195.34  66,685.53  3.89  2,976,746  
Independent variable 
    
Female councilors (%) (H1a) 12.17  8.18  0 40.9 
Female mayor or vice mayor (H1b) 0.04  0.19  0 1 
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b) 8.70  6.47  0 44.1 
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a) 16.57  14.90  0 79.17  
Female councilors' expertise (H3) 2.44  1.19  0 9 
Controls 
    
Mayor's re-elections 1.76  0.99  1 10 
Mayor’s vote share (%) 65.32  21.22  25.39 100 
Mayor’s conservative party support 0.37  0.48  0 1 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.21  1.66  2.4 18.20  
Agricultural sector economy (%) 6.94  6.59  0.01 33.65  
Municipal merger 0.50  0.50  0 1 
Lag of accumulated debts/capita   440,994.00    235,014.40  25,727.03 4,173,950  
Lag of accumulated reserves/capita 88,973.46  84,116.29  937.1074 1,536,181  
Year dummy 3.50  1.71  1 6 
Region dummy 3.47  1.99  0 7 
  
TABLE 2, PANEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
TABLE 2, PANEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (CONTINUED) 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Lag of accumulated debts/capita overall 440,994.00 235,014.40 25,727.03 4,173,950.00 N = 4,583  
 
between 
 
227,541.20 33,322.87 2,576,996.00 n = 764  
 
within 
 
59,198.48 -1,083,253.00 2,037,948.00 T-bar = 6  
Lag of accumulated reserves/capita overall 88,973.46 84,116.29 937.11 1,536,181.00 N =  4,583  
 
between 
 
80,472.94 7,223.29 1,379,497.00 n = 764  
 
within 
 
24,618.73 -72,870.89 506,068.50 T-bar = 6  
Year dummy overall 3.50 1.71 1.00 6.00 N =  4,584  
 
between 
 
0.00 3.50 3.50 n = 764  
 
within 
 
1.71 1.00 6.00 T = 6  
Region dummy overall 3.47 1.99 0.00 7.00 N =  4,512  
 
between 
 
1.99 0.00 7.00 n = 752  
  within   0.00 3.47 3.47 T = 6  
 
 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Dependent variables 
       
Municipal Bonds/capita overall 39,349.54 48,688.39 0.00 2,954,098.00 N = 4,584 
 
between 
 
26,686.97 0.00 559,548.90 n = 764 
 
within 
 
40,732.56 -481,762.00 2,433,898.00 T = 6 
Public Investment/capita overall 1,457.88 3,448.40 0.00 100,054.60 N = 4,584 
 
between 
 
2,599.83 0.00 18,963.94 n = 764 
 
within 
 
2,267.10 -17,506.06 84,825.19 T = 6 
Reserve Funds/capita overall 15,195.34 66,685.53 3.89 2,976,746.00 N = 4,584 
 
between 
 
32,245.40 52.96 582,723.10 n = 764 
 
within 
 
58,380.88 -565,610.30 2,409,218.00 T = 6 
Independent variables 
     
  
 Female councilors (%)  overall 12.17 8.18 0.00 40.90 N = 4,580
 
between 
 
7.88 0.00 38.50 n = 764 
 
within 
 
2.18 -0.23 24.70 T-bar = 6 
Female mayor or vice mayor  overall 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 N = 4,577 
 
between 
 
0.16 0.00 1.00 n = 764 
 
within 
 
0.10 -0.80 0.87 T-bar = 6 
Female mid-level managers (%)  overall 8.70 6.47 0.00 44.10 N = 4,578 
 
between 
 
5.84 0.00 29.85 n = 764 
 
within 
 
2.79 -10.35 41.69 T-bar = 6 
Conservative ideology (%) overall 16.57 14.90 0.00 79.17 N = 4,569 
 
between 
 
14.65 0.00 77.78 n = 764 
 
within 
 
2.75 -17.16 50.49 T-bar = 6 
Female councilors' expertise  overall 2.44 1.19 0.00 9.00 N = 4,577 
 
between 
 
1.04 0.00 8.33 n = 764 
 
within 
 
0.58 -0.89 5.78 T-bar = 6 
Controls 
     
  
 Mayor's re-elections overall 1.76 0.99 1.00 10.00 N = 4,570
 
between 
 
0.76 1.00 6.33 n = 
 
 
within 
 
0.64 -2.74 7.43 T-bar = 6
Mayor’s vote share (%) overall 65.32 21.22 25.39 100.00 N = 4,576 
 
between 
 
16.39 29.88 100.00 n = 
 
 
within 
 
13.50 21.75 125.18 T-bar = 6
Mayor’s conservative party support overall 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 N = 4,579 
 
between 
 
0.39 0.00 1.00 n = 
 
 
within 
 
0.28 -0.47 1.20 T-bar = 6
Unemployment rate (%) overall 6.21 1.66 2.40 18.20 N = 4,584 
 
between 
 
1.55 2.50 16.40 n = 
 
 
within 
 
0.60 3.71 8.71 T = 6
Agricultural sector economy (%) overall 6.94 6.59 0.01 33.65 N = 4,584 
 
between 
 
6.55 0.02 33.42 n = 764 
 
within 
 
0.74 3.91 9.96 T = 6 
Municipal merger overall 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 N = 4,584 
 
between 
 
0.50 0.00 1.00 n = 764 
 
within 
 
0.00 0.50 0.50 T = 6 
  
Empirical Strategies 
We investigate the impact of female representation in both local administrative bodies and legislatures on 
risk-taking behavior in public finance by using a panel dataset of Japanese municipalities covering the 
2007-2012 period. In our main analysis, we report random-effects estimations with Huber–White standard 
errors. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. We employ the random-effects model for sev-
eral reasons. First, our main interest is in exploring variations across municipalities rather than variations 
within municipalities. Second, most importantly, fixed-effects (FE) models are not possible in this study 
since values of our main explanatory variable of interest, female councilors, change only once during our 
data period. This is because the term length of the local council is four-years and our data set covers a six-
year period. Therefore, there is only one change in the gender composition of councilors unless there is 
dissolution of the local council or election to fill a vacancy. In addition, some of our explanatory and con-
trol variables – such as legislators’ ideology, mayors’ re-election, and municipal mergers – tend not to vary 
much within municipalities during the six-year period (See Table 2 for panel descriptive statistics). For 
instance, the within-municipality standard deviations are close to zero for most independent and control 
variables (with the exception of mayor’s vote share and lag of accumulated debts and reserves). In other 
words, for those regressors, most of the variation is between units rather than within the unit. This con-
straint renders FE estimators inefficient because they rely on within unit variation (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010).  
 
As a remedy for the limitations of our data set that prevent us from correcting for unit fixed effects, we 
conduct analysis with the following empirical strategies. First, we use clustered standard errors at the mu-
nicipal level in our analysis (table 4). Second, we control for regional fixed effects by using a region dum-
my variable (table 5). Third, we perform a series of robustness checks to demonstrate empirical validity of 
findings. For example, table A1 in appendix reports the results obtained from similar specification models 
in which we dropt the agricultural sector economy variable, for it is correlated with female councilors (r=-
0.51), conservative ideology (r=-0.47), and lag of accumulated debts/capita (r=0.49). In addition, tables A2 
and A3 in appendix report population-averaged estimations as well as pooled OLS estimations of the same 
specification models.  
 
Table 3 shows a correlation matrix of all variables, which shows few instances of autocorrelation. The 
variance inflation factors (VIF) for the regression models show that multicollinearity is not an issue (1.03 
and 4.54). However, the higher value of VIF is caused by an interaction term between female councilor 
and conservative ideology (after centering). VIF values for other variables are below 2.0.  
 
 
 
  
TABLE 3, CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
Explaining Risk Taking Behaviors in Japanese Municipalities 
Table 4 reports the random-effect estimates for the impact of female representation on risk-taking behav-
ior in local public finance, which is operationalized with three indicators: municipal bonds/capita, invest-
ment in public corporations/capita, and municipal budget allocated to reserve funds/capita. In models 1 
and 2 in table 4, municipal bonds is the dependent variable. Model 1 includes independent and control 
variables. Model 2 adds an interaction term between female councilor and conservative ideology of local 
councilors to test H2b. We run the same models for other two dependent variables (public investment and 
reserve funds). In explaining municipal bonds (Models 1-2), the coefficient of female councilors is negative 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Holding all other factors constant, as the percentage of female 
legislators increases by one percent, issuing of municipal bonds/capita will decrease by 144.84 Japanese 
Yen (around 1.3 USD). Therefore, our hypothesis (H1a) receives empirical support, as an increase in fe-
male councilors reduces municipal bonds, holding all else constant. However, the coefficients of female 
mayor or vice mayor (H1b), female representation in middle-level managerial positions (H1b), and female 
councilors’ expertise (H3) fail to reach statistical significance. Therefore, H1b and H3 receive no empirical 
support. Conservative ideology of local councilors (H2) is negatively and statistically significantly associat-
ed with municipal bonds. Holding other factors constant, the stronger the conservative ideology in the 
local legislature, the less likely the municipal government is to issue bonds. This finding confirms H2a. 
However, the interaction term is not significant. Thus, H2b fails to receive empirical support.  
  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Municipal Bonds/capita 1 
                 
2 Public Investment/capita 0.09 1 
                
3 Reserve Funds/capita 0.02 0.02 1 
               
4 Female councilors (%)  -0.19 -0.12 -0.06 1 
              
5 Female mayor or vice mayor  -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.12 1 
             
6 
Female mid-level managers 
(%)  0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.05 1 
            
7 Conservative ideology (%) -0.14 -0.05 -0.06 0.41 0.09 0.09 1 
           
8 Female councilors' expertise  -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.27 0.06 -0.01 0.14 1 
          
9 Mayor's re-elections -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.18 -0.05 -0.02 0.16 0.05 1 
         
10 Mayor’s vote share (%) 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.13 -0.05 0.00 -0.13 -0.06 0.20 1 
        
11 
Mayor’s conservative party 
support -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.24 0.10 1 
       
12 Unemployment rate (%) 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.02 1 
      
13 
Agricultural sector economy 
(%) 0.21 0.10 0.08 -0.51 -0.09 -0.10 -0.47 -0.21 -0.22 0.11 -0.22 -0.08 1 
     
14 Municipal merger 0.20 0.07 0.03 -0.43 -0.04 -0.04 -0.35 -0.13 -0.28 0.05 -0.16 -0.14 0.40 1 
    
15 
Lag of accumulated 
debts/capita 0.34 0.21 0.08 -0.41 -0.04 0.05 -0.25 -0.15 -0.20 0.07 -0.15 0.02 0.49 0.33 1 
   
16 
Lag of accumulated 
reserves/capita 0.07 0.04 0.22 -0.13 -0.03 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 -0.14 0.23 0.20 0.13 1 
  
17 Year dummy 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.08 0.08 0.02 -0.14 0.20 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.13 1 
 
18 Region dummy 0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.21 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.05 -0.09 0.00 -0.13 0.15 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.00 1 
 
  
TABLE 4, EXPLAINING RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPANESE MUNICIPALITIES: 
RANDOM-EFFECTS MODEL 
 
 
Two of the control variables show statistical significance. The coefficient of municipal merger is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This finding makes sense as the central government of Japan al-
lowed local governments to issue more bonds following municipal mergers to prepare for city planning 
after the mergers. Lag of accumulated debts/capita is positively associated with the issuance of municipal 
bonds at the 0.01 level. Holding all else constant, municipalities tend to issue more bonds as in the prior 
year their accumulated debt increases. 
 
Model 3-4 in table 4 explain our second dependent variable– municipal investment in public enterprise, 
quasi-public corporations, and public interest corporations. Model 3 includes independent and control 
variables, and model 4 adds an interaction term between female councilor and conservative ideology of 
local councilors to test H2b. According to Model 3 and 4, the results show that female councilors are neg-
atively associated with the dependent variable at the 0.01 confidence level. Holding other factors constant, 
female representation in local councils reduces risky investment in public enterprises. A 1 percent increase 
in female councilor representation reduces public investment/ capita by 31.40 JP Yen (approximately 
0.28USD). The impact is not large; however, it shows a statistically significant impact of female councilors 
  Municipal Bonds Public Investment Reserve Funds 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable             
Female councilors (%) (H1a) -144.84*** -140.60*** -31.40*** -31.63*** -137.57 -154.49 
 
(48.13) (51.42) (11.69) (12.27) (127.18) (126.84) 
Female mayor or vice mayor (H1b) -158.96 -127.84 688.81 687.45 -355.84 -473.63 
 
(1,359.34) (1,339.56) (737.42) (738.49) (1,588.87) (1,584.08) 
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b) 51.36 52.64 18.85* 18.80* -319.17 -324.29 
 
(57.06) (57.41) (10.18) (10.25) (231.97) (230.40) 
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a) -72.89*** -56.32 -4.57 -5.67 -171.64** -240.68** 
 
(26.09) (51.92) (5.99) (11.96) (81.97) (110.72) 
Female councilors x Conservative ideology ( H2b) 
 
-1.22 
 
0.08 
 
5.11 
  
(3.08) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(5.99) 
Female councilors' expertise (H3) -925.23 -940.14 48.13 48.56 1,771.66 1,821.35 
 
(691.91) (709.74) (57.42) (57.02) (1,149.58) (1,150.63) 
Controls 
      Mayor's re-elections 41.87 44.58 64.14 64.05 -1,547.80 -1,553.75 
 
(352.95) (350.97) (44.52) (44.36) (1,368.37) (1,368.58) 
Mayor’s vote share (%) -50.48 -50.92 -1.07 -1.05 -0.34 1.27 
 
(36.56) (37.04) (2.26) (2.25) (52.90) (52.64) 
Mayor’s conservative party support 150.97 177.37 -138.00 -138.82 -336.18 -436.67 
 
(823.01) (809.64) (133.21) (134.78) (1,938.48) (1,902.89) 
Unemployment rate (%) 364.08 363.01 101.88 102.05 2,302.88*** 2,307.26*** 
 
(253.43) (253.21) (76.12) (76.17) (846.07) (843.62) 
Agricultural sector economy (%) 213.22 216.34 -3.47 -3.63 -140.49 -152.20 
 
(142.92) (146.88) (21.00) (21.14) (204.81) (198.52) 
Municipal merger 7,019.71*** 7,013.22*** -19.86 -18.77 -6,632.08 -6,587.93 
 
(1,888.35) (1,895.22) (236.91) (236.24) (5,534.65) (5,536.60) 
Lag of accumulated debts/capita 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.00* 0.00* 0.02** 0.02** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Lag of accumulated reserves/capita -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy No No No No No No 
Constant 5,890.83 5,931.31 -23.20 -27.10 -21,241.64** -21,381.53** 
 
(5,143.57) (5,184.69) (847.81) (843.85) (9,661.87) (9,612.97) 
Observations 4,547 4,547 4,547 4,547 4,547 4,547 
Number of municipality 764 764 764 764 764 764 
R-sq within 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 
R-sq between 0.62 0.62 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
R-sq overall 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
  
on public investment, supporting H1a. Female mid-level managers (H1b) are positively associated with the 
dependent variable, contrary to our expectation. However, the result is significant only at the 0.1 level. 
Coefficients of female mayor or vice mayor (H1b), conservative ideology (H2a), and female councilors’ 
expertise (H3) are not statistically significant. Furthermore, the interaction term between female councilors 
and conservative ideology (H2b) does not reach a statistically significant level of confidence. Therefore, 
H1b, H2a, H2b, and H3 receive no empirical support. Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of 
the lag of accumulated debts/capita is positively associated with public investment only at the 0.1 level.  
 
Finally, Models 5-6 in table 4 explain municipal budget allocated to reserve funds. According to Table 4, 
Model 6, none of the gender-related variables show statistical significance. That is, neither female repre-
sentation in local legislatures nor female representation in municipal administration seems to influence 
financial decision making in terms of allocating budget to reserve funds. Therefore, H1a, H1b, H2b, and 
H3 fail to receive empirical support. However, the conservative ideology variable (H2a) is negatively asso-
ciated with reserve funds at the 0.05 confident level. Holding all other factors constant, a 1 percent in-
crease in the number of conservative councilors reduces municipal budget allocation to reserve funds by 
171 to 240 JP Yen (1.53 to 2.15 USD). This finding gives empirical support for H2a.  
 
Three of our control variables gain statistical significance. The coefficient of unemployment rate is posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This result suggests that after holding all else constant, for 
each 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, the municipal budget allocated to reserve 
funds/capita tends to increase by 2,302 to 2,307 JP Yen (approximately 21 USD). Likewise, the coeffi-
cients of lag of accumulated debts/capita and lag of accumulated reserves/capita are positive and statisti-
cally significant at the 0.05 level and 0.01 level, respectively; however, their impacts are very small (0.02 – 
0.22). If a municipality has more accumulated debts or financial reserves in prior years, the municipality is 
likely to allocate more budget to reserve funds, assuming all else is constant.   
 
Table 5 reports results of the same models with a region dummy variable. Recall that we conduct this 
analysis as a robustness check and to control for any regional fixed effects. Table 5 shows that coefficients 
of female councilors (H1a) and conservative ideology (H2a) are negative and statistically significant at the 
0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively, even after controlling for region fixed effects. These findings demonstrate 
the robustness of our results.  
Coefficients of female mid-level manager, which were positive and significant only at the 0.1 level in the 
main model (Table 4), are no longer significant in models 3-4 (Table 5). In the appendix, we report the 
series of results of our robustness check models. In models 1-2, coefficients of female councilors are posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level in two of our robustness check models (Tables A1 and 
A3). In the population-averaged model (Table A2), the significance level for female councilors decreases, 
but it is still significant at the 0.1 level. Therefore, these results demonstrate robustness of negative im-
pacts of female councilors on municipal bonds (H1a).  
  
TABLE 5, EXPLAINING RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPANESE MUNICIPALITIES: 
RANDOM-EFFECTS MODEL WITH REGION DUMMY 
 
The link between conservative ideology and municipal bonds is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
across our robustness check models, giving empirical support to H2a. Regarding the public investment 
models (models 3-4), the female councilors variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
across two of our three robustness check models, demonstrating robustness of the results for H1a. The 
female mid-level manager variable is not significant across two of our robustness check models. Thus, 
results suggest that H1b receives no empirical support. In models 5-6, conservative ideology is negative 
and significant at the 0.05 level across two models (tables A2 and A3) and at the 0.1 level (table A1). Thus, 
the impacts of conservative ideology on reserve funds are still robust after testing different models.  
 
In sum, our robustness check results demonstrate that results from our main models (tables 4-5) survive 
through analysis with three robustness check models. As we expected, gender representation in local 
councils is negatively correlated with risk-taking behavior measures represented by the issuance of munici-
pal bonds and budget allocation to public investment, holding all other factors constant (H1a). Conserva-
tive ideology is also negatively associated with these two dependent variables (H2a). However, we do not 
  Municipal Bonds Public Investment Reserve Funds 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable             
Female councilors (%) (H1a) -150.91*** -153.55*** -25.35** -26.01** -71.58 -68.63 
 
(53.92) (56.25) (11.38) (11.90) (113.07) (112.21) 
Female mayor or vice mayor (H1b) 776.44 763.36 758.13 754.76 -2,183.63 -2,170.02 
 
(1,267.56) (1,269.94) (751.04) (751.22) (2,034.81) (2,012.30) 
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b) 24.86 23.52 14.85 14.60 -257.17 -255.75 
 
(65.45) (66.09) (9.69) (9.77) (243.84) (239.31) 
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a) -83.14** -95.69 -4.03 -8.37 -146.14** -131.77 
 
(32.35) (58.57) (7.01) (13.78) (70.51) (107.39) 
Female councilors x Conservative ideology (H2b) 
 
0.92 
 
0.34 
 
-1.06 
  
(3.00) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(7.29) 
Female councilors' expertise (H3) -890.04 -879.48 69.43 70.68 1,519.07 1,506.95 
 
(710.05) (714.11) (50.62) (50.51) (1,123.26) (1,116.93) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14,831.82 14,830.20 1,924.07* 1,916.74* -23,758.12** -23,742.62** 
 
(18,955.80) (18,957.08) (1,022.73) (1,021.36) (10,371.74) (10,365.91) 
Observations 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 
Number of municipality 752 752 752 752 752 752 
R-sq within 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11 
R-sq between 0.61 0.61 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 
R-sq overall 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 
Control variables are not reported. 
      Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
  
find empirical support for the impact of female representation in the administrative body (H1b), multipli-
cative effects of female councilors and conservative ideology (H2b), or female councilors’ expertise (H3).   
 
Discussions and Limitations 
In this study, our first goal is to test how female representation in local legislatures, mayoral and vice-
mayoral positions, and municipal mid-level managerial positions affects financial decision-making. Our 
second and third goal are to test whether the political ideology of local councils and expertise of female 
elected officials affect municipal financial decisions. Financial decision-making is assessed in terms of mu-
nicipal risk-taking behavior through three indicators: issuing municipal bonds/capita, investing in public 
enterprises/capita, and allocating budget to reserve funds/capita. To test our propositions, we rely on a 
data set derived from 752 Japanese city-level governments from the 2007-2012 period, covering at least 
two local administrative/legislative terms in each municipality. After controlling for potential confounding 
factors, findings show that neither expertise of female councilors nor female representation in executive 
(mayor and vice-mayor) and mid-level managerial positions seem to influence municipal financial decision 
making. Likewise, we do not find any multiplicative effect of female council representation and conserva-
tive ideology. However, results show that female representation in local councils is positively correlated 
with risk-averse behavior in financial decisions. Specifically, female representation in city councils is nega-
tively associated with both issuing municipal bonds and local investment in public corporations. Likewise, 
there is a strong negative link between conservative ideology and issuing municipal bonds and contrib-
uting to reserve funds.  
 
Although the number of female legislators is small, our results do suggest that they tend to be risk averse 
in financial decision-making. This finding is in line with studies that examine the gender-financial behavior 
relationship in private organizations (Barua et al. 2010, Charness and Gneezy 2012, Eckel and Grossman 
2002, Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). The small effect may be due, in part, to the relatively low female 
representation in Japanese local legislatures and/or male-dominant gendered institutions in Japanese socie-
ty. Moreover, it can be said that Japanese local legislators’ role in proposing new legislation tends to be 
passive, as they are primarily dedicated to either passing or modifying mayors’ propositions. For instance, 
in 2011, only 10.7 percent of the city-level local councils issued any vote against a mayor’s proposition and 
only 8 percent of councils submitted a proposal for municipal ordinances (Hirose and Local Council Re-
form Forum 2012). Such contextual factors may restrict the potential influence of female representation in 
local governments. However, conversely, we can also argue that our evidence suggests that gender repre-
sentation in local councils has an impact, even in a context of low gender equality.  
Our study is not without limitations. First, our data set covers only a six-year period (2007-2012) that cor-
responds in most municipalities to only two administrative/legislative terms. The fact that Japanese mu-
nicipalities did not gain full autonomy in financial decision making until after this study period also impos-
es a limitation. Second, data unavailability impedes us from assessing the role of women’s committee as-
  
signments in local assemblies, as well as the role of female councilors’ career and educational backgrounds. 
Third, our study assesses the relationships between female representation and risk-taking/averse outcomes 
of public finance, not a causal mechanism between them, due to the nature of our data set. One needs 
time-series or experimental data to make causal arguments. Future studies should undertake this task as 
data becomes available.  
 
Conclusions 
This study examines the understudied association between female representation and public finance. We 
examine both elected (mayor and legislators) and administrative (mid-level managers) positions in an un-
derstudied developed setting: Japanese local governments. Japan is a relevant case to study, as among both 
developed and developing countries, it ranks very low in terms of gender representation in politics. More-
over, although a considerable number of studies have addressed gender representation and financial risk-
taking behavior in the private sector, scarce attention has been given to local public finances. Our study 
seeks to address this research gap.  
 
This study contributes to the understanding of the association between gender representation and local 
public finance. The findings of this study suggest a significant link between the presence of female counci-
lors and outputs in public finance. The findings also suggest that the gender-financial decision making 
relationship observed in private organizations holds in the context of public organizations. After control-
ling for potential confounding factors, findings show that female representation in local councils and con-
servative ideology are positively correlated with risk-averse behavior in financial decisions. Specifically, 
female representation in city councils is negatively associated with issuing municipal bonds, as well as with 
local investment in public corporations. Likewise, conservative ideology is negatively correlated to issuing 
municipal bonds and budget allocation to reserve funds. We do not find financial decision-making effects 
of female representation among executives and mid-level managers. This lack of effect may be due the 
small numbers of female mayors and vice-mayors in Japan. For instance, only 3.5 percent of city-level 
municipalities had either a female mayor or a female vice mayor in 2012. Such low levels of female repre-
sentation in executive positions may impede gender effects on financial decision-making. Future research 
should explore whether these findings hold when investigating the effects of female representation at oth-
er levels of government, such as state and national legislatures. Moreover, survey studies of female legisla-
tors and female managers in the executive branch should be employed to shed light on female preferences 
in financial decision-making.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
REFERENCES 
Acker, Joan. 1992. "From sex roles to gendered institutions."  Contemporary sociology 21 (5):565-569. 
Alt, James E, and Robert C Lowry. 1994. "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: 
Evidence from the States."  American Political Science Review 88 (04):811-828. 
Atkinson, Stanley M, Samantha Boyce Baird, and Melissa B Frye. 2003. "Do female mutual fund managers 
manage differently?"  Journal of Financial Research 26 (1):1-18. 
Avellaneda, Claudia N. 2016. "Government Performance and Chief Executives’ Intangible Assets: 
Motives, Networking, and/or Capacity?"  Public Management Review 18 (6):918-947. 
Barber, Brad M, and Terrance Odean. 2001. "Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common 
stock investment."  Quarterly journal of Economics:261-292. 
Barua, Abhijit, Lewis F Davidson, Dasaratha V Rama, and Sheela Thiruvadi. 2010. "CFO gender and 
accruals quality."  Accounting Horizons 24 (1):25-39. 
Bellucci, Andrea, Alexander Borisov, and Alberto Zazzaro. 2010. "Does gender matter in bank–firm 
relationships? Evidence from small business lending."  Journal of Banking & Finance 34 (12):2968-2984. 
Berger, Allen N, Thomas Kick, and Klaus Schaeck. 2014. "Executive board composition and bank risk 
taking."  Journal of Corporate Finance 28:48-65. 
Bernasek, Alexandra, and Stephanie Shwiff. 2001. "Gender, risk, and retirement."  Journal of economic issues 
35 (2):345-356. 
Bochel, Catherine, and Hugh Bochel. 2005. "Exploring the low levels of women's representation in 
Japanese local government."  Japanese Journal of Political Science 6 (03):375-392. 
Bochel, Catherine, Hugh Bochel, Masashi Kasuga, and Hideko Takeyasu. 2003. "Against the system? 
Women in elected local government in Japan."  Local Government Studies 29 (2):19-31. 
Bratton, Kathleen A, and Leonard P Ray. 2002. "Descriptive representation, policy outcomes, and 
municipal day-care coverage in Norway."  American Journal of Political Science:428-437. 
Cabinet Office of Japan. 2015a. "Progress of gender-equal society and promotion of gender policy in local 
governments [Chihou Koukyou Dantai ni okeru Danjo Kyodo Sankaku Shakai no Keisei mataha Josei ni kansuru 
Shisaku no Shinchoku Jokyo]." accessed August 4. 
http://www.gender.go.jp/research/kenkyu/suishinjokyo/2015/pdf/rep/05-3-1.pdf. 
  
Cabinet Office of Japan. 2015b. "Danjo Kydou Sankaku Hakusho Heisei 27 nen ban [White Paper on Gender 
Equality 2015]." In. http://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/whitepaper/h27/zentai/index.html#pdf 
(accessed October 22, 2016). 
Cabinet Office of Japan. 2016a. "Map of female political participation 2016 [Josei no Seiji Sankaku Mappu 
2016]." accessed August 4. http://www.gender.go.jp/policy/mieruka/pdf/map_josei_2016.pdf. 
Cabinet Office of Japan. 2016b. "White Paper on Gender Equality 2016 [Danjo Kyoudou Sankaku Hakusho 
Heisei 28 nen ban]. ." accessed August 7. 
http://www.gender.go.jp/about_danjo/whitepaper/h28/zentai/index.html. 
Charness, Gary, and Uri Gneezy. 2012. "Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking."  Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (1):50-58. 
Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a 
randomized policy experiment in India."  Econometrica 72 (5):1409-1443. 
Chen, Guoli, Craig Crossland, and Sterling Huang. 2014. "Female board representation and corporate 
acquisition intensity."  Strategic Management Journal. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLES 
 
TABLE A1, EXPLAINING RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPANESE MUNICIPALITIES: 
RANDOM-EFFECTS MODEL WITHOUT AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ECONOMY VARIABLE 
  Municipal Bonds Public Investment Reserve Funds 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable             
Female councilors (%) (H1a) -188.59*** -193.22*** -25.96** -26.58** -25.47 -20.55 
 
(62.41) (64.24) (11.57) (12.05) (110.58) (113.45) 
Female mayor or vice mayor (H1b) 525.71 503.71 755.67 752.43 -1,909.73 -1,887.08 
 
(1,242.53) (1,245.77) (750.23) (750.35) (1,939.68) (1,921.31) 
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b) 15.30 12.83 14.76 14.51 -246.53 -243.97 
 
(66.95) (67.79) (9.64) (9.72) (238.26) (233.51) 
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a) -110.00*** -133.97** -4.56 -8.97 -112.52* -86.04 
 
(41.06) (65.32) (7.06) (13.72) (60.12) (116.42) 
Female councilors x Conservative ideology (H2b) 
 
1.79 
 
0.35 
 
-1.98 
  
(2.99) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(7.66) 
Female councilors' expertise (H3) -946.57 -925.33 68.98 70.30 1,571.31 1,549.11 
 
(738.99) (737.97) (50.83) (50.70) (1,124.61) (1,115.46) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 17,307.25 17,270.88 1,975.72* 1,963.42* -26,719.01** -26,661.78** 
 
(20,482.46) (20,473.12) (1,051.98) (1,049.17) (11,103.58) (11,049.00) 
Observations 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 
Number of municipality 752 752 752 752 752 752 
R-sq within 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11 
R-sq between 0.62 0.62 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 
R-sq overall 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08 
Control variables are not reported. 
      Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
TABLE A2, EXPLAINING RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPANESE MUNICIPALITIES: POPULA-
TION-AVERAGED MODEL 
  Municipal Bonds Public Investment Reserve Funds 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable             
Female councilors (%) (H1a) -106.98* -108.70* -25.30** -25.97** -59.43 -63.72 
 
(55.34) (58.47) (11.33) (11.86) (106.04) (106.81) 
Female mayor or vice mayor (H1b) 461.98 453.59 757.66 754.48 -2,298.76 -2,320.29 
 
(1,310.09) (1,310.94) (748.54) (748.76) (2,040.44) (2,021.88) 
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b) 11.61 10.75 15.01 14.71 -260.11 -262.29 
 
(71.19) (71.45) (9.67) (9.75) (230.87) (227.45) 
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a) -89.21*** -97.11* -3.96 -8.25 -135.32** -156.04 
 
(33.47) (53.65) (6.96) (13.69) (62.66) (98.36) 
Female councilors x Conservative ideology (H2b) 
 
0.58 
 
0.33 
 
1.53 
  
(2.83) 
 
(0.70) 
 
(6.24) 
Female councilors' expertise (H3) -829.67 -822.58 69.66 70.82 1,208.08 1,224.03 
 
(667.79) (674.10) (50.47) (50.36) (970.16) (967.17) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 8,968.93 8,969.80 1,916.12* 1,911.31* -21,386.34** -21,383.95** 
 
(14,247.64) (14,248.49) (1,020.18) (1,018.62) (9,810.61) (9,807.02) 
       
Observations 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 
Number of municipality 752 752 752 752 752 752 
Control variables are not reported. 
      Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A3, EXPLAINING RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC FINANCE IN JAPANESE MUNICIPALITIES:  
POOLED OLS MODEL 
 
Municipal Bonds Public Investment Reserve Funds 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable             
Female councilors (%) (H1a) -150.91*** -153.55*** -18.62 -16.23 -53.37 -61.35 
 
(53.92) (56.25) (12.33) (12.58) (103.08) (104.62) 
Female mayor or vice mayor (H1b) 776.44 763.36 560.61 572.40 -2,346.90 -2,386.37 
 
(1,267.56) (1,269.94) (684.02) (684.01) (2,057.62) (2,040.19) 
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b) 24.86 23.52 43.44*** 44.65*** -259.69 -263.73 
 
(65.45) (66.09) (15.12) (15.47) (224.53) (221.78) 
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a) -83.14** -95.69 1.78 13.10 -129.67** -167.53* 
 
(32.35) (58.57) (7.24) (14.48) (59.16) (94.80) 
Female councilors x Conservative ideology (H2b) 
 
0.92 
 
-0.83 
 
2.78 
  
(3.00) 
 
(0.73) 
 
(5.78) 
Female councilors' expertise (H3) -890.04 -879.48 128.79* 119.27 1,057.10 1,088.94 
 
(710.05) (714.11) (75.77) (76.95) (903.19) (901.64) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14,831.82 14,830.20 779.34 780.80 -20,250.26** -20,255.15** 
 
(18,955.80) (18,957.08) (1,089.88) (1,092.11) (9,577.12) (9,576.79) 
Observations 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 4,481 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.08 
Control variables are not reported.       
               Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
i
 Political and social system of Japan is still men-dominant and is interpreted from the perspective of men in leading 
positions. Therefore, political and administrative institutions are gendered along lines of men’s’ standpoint (Acker 1992). 
ii
 Park (2014) also examines the impacts of female representation both at the state level and county level on welfare 
spending in California. Specifically, Park (2014) relies on ten years’ spending data of 58 counties in California and finds 
that female representation on county boards has no significant effect on local welfare spending. However, at the state 
level, Park (2014) does find that female representation in the legislature is positively associated with increases in wel-
fare spending. 
iii
 Our study focuses on ideology of legislators not ideology of mayors. This is because most mayors are not affiliated 
with any political party in the Japanese context even though they receive support from political parties during election 
campaign. For instance, only 2 mayors out of 809 mayors were affiliated with political party in 2011(Chihō Jichi Sōgō 
Kenkyūjo 2012).  
iv
 For instance, regional disparities in unemployment rate were the lowest, and regional differences in GDP per capita 
were the fifth lowest among OECD countries (OECD 2014). 
v
 Local governments can determine the number of vice-mayors by ordinance (MIC n.d.-b, Osugi 2009). 
vi
 38 cities are dropped due to data unavailability.  
vii
 Approximately 30% of all municipalities held mayoral and local council elections in April 2011 and April 2007. Howev-
er, elections were not held in those years for the remaining 70% of municipalities.   
viii
 In addition, the Handbook of Data on Japanese Women in Political Life is issued every four years and contains data 
regarding female representation in the local council only in the year of publication (2007, 2011). In other words, in our 
data set (2007-2012), the handbook does not provide data in 2008-2010 or 2012. In filling this gap, we use data from 
2007 and 2011 for these years, depending on the starting year of each local councilor’s term. Local council term data is 
collected from the List of Local Chief Executives (2007-2012 editions) (Chihō Jichi Sōgō Kenkyūjo 2007-2012). Regard-
ing two socioeconomic control variables (unemployment rate and agricultural sector economy), we use the value in 
2005 for the year of 2007, 2008, and 2009, and the value in 2010 for the year of 2010, 2011, and 2012, because these 
variables are available only in the years of 2005 and 2010. 
ix
 To be more specific, the managerial position refers to positions that are higher than section chief in the Japanese local 
government (Cabinet Office of Japan 2016b). 
